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Abstract
The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly contro-
versial topic since Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in
the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data
evidence of the 500 largest firms in Germany in the period 1977-2009 we test two promi-
nent hypothesis in the literature on executive pay: the manager power hypothesis and the
efficient pay hypothesis. We find support for the manager power hypothesis for Germany
as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they
work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for
managers increases in Germany in difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find
further that domestic and global competition for managers has contributed to the rise in
executive pay in Germany. Lastly, we show that CEOs in the banking sector are provided
with incentives for performance and that the great recession of 2009 acted as a disciplining
devise on CEO pay in Germany.
.
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1 Introduction
The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly contro-
versial topic since Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Germany’s Mannesmann in 2000. Man-
nesmann’s supervisory board chaired by Josef Ackermann approved nearly e60 million in
bonuses and severance pay to Mannesmann’s CEO Klaus Esser and other top executives.
Executive compensation is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the global financial
crisis of 2008 as greedy CEOs in the financial industry are seen to have been taking on
too much risks in pursuit of large profit gains. The anger over bonuses continued when
troubled financial institutions such as HypoRealEstate, Bayerische Landesbank, WestLB,
and Dresdner Bank paid out large bonuses despite facing bankruptcy and being saved by
tax payers’ money. In March 2009 Germany’s federal finance minister called for a return
of Dresdner Bank’s 2008 “obscene bonuses”. In response to the public outrage car-maker
BMW announced that their executive remuneration will be linked to blue-collar salaries
(Lawton (2009)). In 2009 the German government announced new rules limiting banking
bonuses. French president Nicolas Sarkozy urged leaders of the world’s top 20 developed
nations (G20) to follow suit. 1
Due to lack of data, the debate on executive pay in Germany has remained anecdotal
and has not been based on solid data. This paper tries to fill this gap. Based on panel data
evidence of the 500 largest firms in Germany in the period of 1977 to 2009, we document
the basic stylized facts of CEO pay in Germany and its determinants in the last three
decades. We then examine the following issues. First, is CEO pay in financial institutions
systematically different from the rest of the economy? Second, is the recent financial
crisis different in terms of compensation compared to previous recessions? Finally, we test
two hypotheses which have gained importance in the theoretical literature on executive
1See “Call for Dresdner execs to return bonuses get mixed response”, Banking Newslink, March 31,
2009; “Germany’s BaFin Clamps Down On Bank Risk Mgmt, Bonuses” , Dow Jones International News,
August 14, 2009; “France announces bank bonus crackdown and urges G20 nations to follow suit”, The
Guardian, August 26, 2009.
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pay: the manager power hypothesis on the one hand and the efficient pay hypothesis on
the other. The managerial power hypothesis (Bebchuk and Fried (2003)) assumes that
executives are self-interested, and are able to influence the level of their own compensation
packages often at the expense of shareholders. According to this view, the level and
composition of pay are determined not by competitive market forces but rather by captive
board members catering to rent-seeking entrenched CEOs. On the other hand, CEO pay
can be used to alleviate the agency problems between shareholders and managers by
aligning their interests. This typically takes the form of performance based remuneration
or of granting executives an ownership stake in the firm. According to the efficient pay
hypothesis formulated by Gabaix and Landier (2008), the marginal product of managerial
ability increases with firm size and it optimally assigns the most talented managers to
the largest firms. Therefore, as the average firm becomes larger, managerial marginal
products increase and competition for scarce managerial talent will bid up compensation
of CEOs. Accordingly, CEO pay should move one-for-one with changes in the size of the
typical firm.
The findings of our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, we find
support for the manager power hypothesis for Germany as executive compensation pack-
ages do not involve incentives for performance. German CEOs tend to be rewarded when
the sector is doing well rather than the firm they work for. We reject, however, the
manager power hypothesis for the financial sector and for the latest recession in 2009.
Second, we reject the efficient pay hypothesis. Increases in the typical firm size do not
appear to contribute to increases in CEO pay in Germany. On the contrary, we find that
CEO pay and the demand for manager talent increases in difficult times when the typical
firm size shrinks, perhaps in an attempt of the firm to optimally limit losses. Third, we
find evidence that domestic and global competition for managers has contributed to the
rise in executive pay in German. Surprisingly, however, the impact of competition for
managers on executive compensation has become weaker in the last two decades. Fourth,
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the effect of local and global competition for managers is particularly pronounced in the
banking sector and has become much more intense in the last two decades after German
unification.
The paper is organized in the following sections. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 documents the evolution of executive pay in Germany in the last three decades with
a particular focus on the question whether the recent financial crisis in 2009 has been
unique in terms of compensation. Section 4 presents the framework and empirical results.
Section 5 introduces a dynamic panel analysis to examine problems of endogeneity. Section
examines whether the financial sector has behaved differently in terms of compensation,
while section 6 concludes. A data appendix gives a documentation of the data and
descriptive statistics.
2 Data and Institutional Background
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the consulting firm Kienbaum. Kienbaum is a
management consultancy specialised in remuneration policies which collects annual infor-
mation on executive compensation of large German firms since 1976. The data contains
information on total compensation of the executive board, number of executive board
members, annual net (after-tax) profits, balance sheet totals2 (for banks), premia (for
insurance companies) and sales (for industry and services)3. Although Kienbaum started
collecting data in 1976, information on profits is available from 1977. Consequently, our
analysis covers the period from 1977 to 2009, 2009 being the last available year at the
time of writing. Information on number of workers is also provided, however only from
1988. Generally, balance sheet totals, sales, premia and number of workers refer to the
size of the public limited company (AGs) or, if it is a controlling company, to the size
2Balance sheet totals are measured by assets, liabilities and ownership equity listed as of a specific
date.
3In the original data set, values are in German Marks until 1999 and have been converted to Euros.
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of the consolidated company4. Each year, our sample contains on average 19 per cent
banks, 16 per cent insurance companies, and 65 per cent of firms in the manufacturing
and services sector.
The value of executive board remuneration includes monetary and non-monetary com-
pensations, therefore values of (fringe) benefits (as long as they are taxable), long- and
mid-term incentives (stock options, performance shares, restricted stocks etc.), short-term
incentives (profit participation on annual profits, mainly results-oriented royalties) and
fixed salary. According to Kienbaum, stock option grants have been evaluated by the com-
panies’ auditors. We conducted detailed research5 on a small sub-sample of the largest
publicly quoted firms, to understand how this evaluation is conducted. Our research indi-
cates that stock option grants are not usually consistently evaluated, neither between nor
within firms (over time). It is worth noting, however, that stock option grants have been
an uncommon pay component in the remuneration package of CEOs of German firms until
the end of the 1990s. In practice, before 1998, German law made performance-related pay
difficult to implement and only a few very large companies (such as Deutsche Bank and
Daimler Benz) are known to have provided such type of payments to their CEOs before
that date6.
More detailed (but still limited) information on composition of CEO compensation is
available from 2005 and for a selected number of firms.7 To keep the long time dimension
of our data set, we need to rely on the information on total compensation of the executive
board within a company. Using information on the number of CEO members, we derive
our variable of interest, average yearly per capita remuneration inside the board.
4Balance sheet total is commonly used to measure enterprise size (see the European Commission
Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises, European Commission (2003)).
5Available on request.
6See Martens (2003) for a detailed account of changes in German law regulating compensation in the
form of stock options.
7This change follows the 2005 Vorstandsvergu¨tungs-Offenlegungsgesetz, a law requiring the public
disclosure of compensation of executive board members. This law, however, has been implemented only
in a handful of Bundesla¨nder at the time of writing.
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The Kienbaum data set is a unique source of information on executive remuneration in
Germany. The main advantages of the data set are its large sample size, long time span,
and coverage of the banking sector. Information on executive compensation is available at
a very aggregate level (break-down by board members and by type of salary is available
only from 2005) and information on firms is limited to balance sheets, sales, premia,
profits and number of workers.
The Kienbaum sample includes the largest 100 firms (according to the German stock
index and similar indexes calculated by the Deutsche Bo¨rse, discussed below) and about
1000 corporations (Aktiensgesellschaften or AGs) and large limited liability companies
(Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung or GmbHs). The data set is an unbalanced
panel. Over 94% companies are observed at least twice and 37 companies have been
followed through the entire period. Generally, information on fewer than 1000 firms is
collected before the 1980s. After 1981, sample size fluctuates between 1000 and 2000
observations.
A specific sampling scheme is not followed through the years. This potentially creates a
problem in the statistical analysis if, for example, some results are driven by the exogenous
inclusion of smaller companies in some years rather than others8. Furthermore, for the
same reason we cannot establish whether an entrance in (exit from) the data corresponds
to an entrance in (exit from) the market.
For these reasons, we choose to focus on those companies which were among the largest
500 in at least one of the years under investigation. We identify the largest companies
using as a measure of size the value of balance sheet total for banks, insurance premia for
insurance companies and sales for firms in the industry and service sectors. We also include
companies listed by the Deutsche Bo¨rse according to one of its main stock indexes9. This
8As a matter of fact, we see this in the data, when analysing mean trends of profits and of CEO
compensation. In 1982 and following years, when about 300 more companies were added to the sample,
mean profits and compensation appear significantly lower than in 1981. This however appears to be
due to the increase in sample size, rather than an actual decrease in the means following some economic
downturn (see analysis below).
9The German stock market index DAX measures the performance of the Prime Standard’s 30 largest
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sampling restriction has two main advantages. First, it helps mitigating potential biases
due to the (for our purposes) arbitrary sampling scheme adopted by Kienbaum. Second,
it makes our data set more suitable for comparisons with dominant US literature (where
the focus is usually on the top 500 corporations).
The German case is particularly interesting because corporate governance differs greatly
from the US. German corporate governance is characterised by the presence of co-determination
(Mitbestimmung): in all publicly quoted companies (Aktiengesellschaft), the executive
board is nominated by the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat or board of directors), whereby
members of the supervisory board are representatives of workers and of shareholders. Al-
though in case of disagreement the representative of the major stockholder will have the
final say, the consequences of this “two-tier” system may represent a stronger control on
compensation of the executive board than the “one-tier” system in the US. Such corpo-
rate differences imply that theoretical and empirical results based on US evidence may
not necessarily apply toGermany.
3 Stylized Facts
We start documenting the trend in CEO pay in Germany in need of explanation. Figure
1, Panel (a) shows the mean of CEO compensation for the total board as well as per board
member at 2006 prices for the 500 largest German firms in the period 1977-2009. Red
vertical lines indicate official recession dates as given by the German National Statistical
office. It appears that the time pattern of CEO pay is characterized by three distinct
periods. In the period 1977-1982 CEO pay was basically flat or declining, in 1983-1992
real compensation started to increase by 4 percent annually followed by a steep increase
German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in terms of order book volume and market
capitalization. The other indexes used by Kienbaum to select companies are the MDAX and TecDAX.
The MDAX includes the 50 Prime Standard companies from classic sectors (i.e., excluding the technology
sector) that rank immediately below the companies included in the DAX index. The TecDAX includes
the 30 largest German companies from the technology sector that rank immediately below the companies
included in the DAX index.
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in 1992-2000 with an annual increase of 10 percent. Finally, in 2001-2009 CEO pay first
declined when the dot com bubble burst in 2001-2002 to increase sharply in 2003 with a
strong decline again in the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Over the entire period 1977-2007
CEO pay per head increased in real terms (at 2006 prices) from over e200.000 to almost
e700.000 which is a 3.5 fold increase. This is substantial, indeed, but not as dramatic an
increase as in the US.10
Figure 1: Board Compensation, 1977-2009
All Firms
(a) Mean across Firms (b) Selected Percentiles
Note: Vertical bars indicate official recession years in Germany. Pay levels (in 2006-constant Euros) based on data
for 500 largest public and limited liabilities companies. Total remuneration defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses,
benefits, stock options, stock grants, and other compensation. Percentiles are evaluated for per capita real wages of
board only.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 - showing selected percentiles of CEO pay per board member -
documents that the increase in compensation since the beginning of the 1990s is largely
due to an increase of the best paid CEOs. CEO pay of the top 5 percent earners has
increased from about e500.000 to e2.3 mio (a more than 4.5 fold increase) while those
of the bottom earners only doubled during 1992-2007. As a result, the explosion of CEO
10In comparison CEO pay in the US increased six-fold in 1980-2003, see Frydman and Saks (2010).
Interestingly, nominal compensation in Germany steadily increased in every year except of the latest
two recession periods. This suggests that in the past, even in difficult times, firms have rarely reduced
nominal compensation of board members.
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pay since the beginning of the 1990s is accompanied by a stark increase in the variance
of pay among executives.11
In Panel (a) and (b) of Figure 2 we look at the trend of the mean and median of net real
profits and firms size as possible determinants of CEO pay. Mean and median firm size
steadily increased over the entire period, seemingly giving initial support to the efficient
pay hypothesis, which claims that the shift in the entire distribution of firms leads to a
proportional shift in compensation. However, median firm size increased from e 250 mio
in 1977 to about e 1.3 billion which is a 5.2 fold increase, while median compensation per
board member increased only 1.8 fold, suggesting that other determinants may have played
a role for the evolution of compensation in Germany. Net real profits, an indicator for
firm performance, have increased somewhat over the period 1992-2007 but have exhibited
much more volatility compared to CEO pay during the same period suggesting that CEO
pay may not entirely be driven by firm performance, giving first support to the manager
power hypothesis.
We turn now to the wage gap between CEO earnings and wages of white collar workers
to show changes in the income distribution among skilled workers. Figure 3 plots the
ratio between CEO compensation (including salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options
and grants as well as other compensation) and average wages of white collar workers.12
This ratio more than doubled: in 1977 per capita compensation was 8 times white collars’
average wages and increased to 17 times in 2007. Note that CEO premium remains almost
flat until 1992 to then steeply increase between 1993-2002 with an even steeper increase
in the period 2004-2007. Note also that the overall change in the income distribution
appears to have been driven to a large extent by a shift in the income distribution within
11As CEO pay increased sharply among the best paid CEOs the median is a more useful measure than
the mean of the typical CEO in a particular year.
12The data for wages of white collar workers come from the Quarterly Earning Survey of the German
Federal Statistical Office which is based on a representative one-stage stratified sample for which response
is compulsory. The data is only available until 2008 at the time of writing. See the Data Appendix for
more information.
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Figure 2: Profits and Firm Size - 1977-2009
All Firms
(a) Mean across Firms (b) Median across Firms
Note: Vertical bars indicate official recession years in Germany. Profits and size (in 2006-constant Euros) based on
data for 500 largest public and limited liabilities companies. Profits are after tax. Size defined as balance sheet
totals (banks), insurance premia (insurance companies), and sales (manufacturing and other services).
Figure 3: Earnings Gap, 1977-2008: Ratio of per-Capita Board Compensation to
Average Earnings
(a) All Firms
Note: Vertical bars indicate official recession years in Germany. Remuneration (defined as the sum of
salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options, stock grants, and other compensation) is calculated as the total
compensation of the executive board divided by the size of the board. In panel (b), the ratio is calculated
with respect to average wage of financial sector employees. Source: Kienbaum compensation data and
German Quarterly Earnings Survey.
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the group of skilled workers rather than between skilled and unskilled worker.13
3.1 Is CEO Pay in the Great Recession different from previous
Recessions?
We turn now to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Anecdotal evidence in the business press
suggests that in the recent global financial crisis the link between CEO pay and perfor-
mance is missing. The public outrage over pay-outs of bonuses in firms facing financial
difficulties have been seen as evidence that compensation is not based on performance. In
response to the public anger over bonuses Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs and Josef
Ackermann of Deutsche Bank among other executives declared they would forego their
bonuses in 2009. In this section we start looking at whether compensation in Germany
in the financial crisis of 2008-2009 has been indeed different from previous recessions.
Figure 4 shows relative changes in CEO compensation, profits, and firm size in the
three years leading to the recessions in 1982, 1993, 2003 and 2009. The largest drop
in CEO pay indeed occured during the latest great recession of 2009, when CEO pay
fell by about 18 percent compared to 11 percent in 1982 and virtually no changes in the
recessions of 1993 and 2003. In contrast, in 2009 firms’ economic performance as measured
by profits was not much worse than in the recession of 2003 and recovered much faster
in 2009. This suggests that the public outcry over compensation in the great recession of
2008-2009 does appear to have imposed a stronger link between CEO remuneration and
firm performance compared to previous recessions. Thus, descriptive evidence appears to
suggest that the link between compensation and performance has become stronger in the
latest recession. We examine this question in greater detail in the next section.
13See Dustmann et al. (2009) for an analysis of changes in the wage structure in Germany. Evidence
from Dustmann et al. (2009), Piketty and Saez (2006) and Dell (2005) is consistent with the idea that
shifts in the income distribution in the US and Germany are largely a phenomenon among the rich.
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4 Empirical Framework and Results
We turn now to a more rigorous analysis of CEO pay in Germany to substantiate the
stylized data given in section 3. In particular we want to test the two most prominent
hypotheses of the CEO literature: the manager power hypothesis and the efficient pay
hypothesis. The manager power hypothesis assumes self-interested executives which are
able to influence the level of their own compensation packages often at the expense of
shareholders. If this hypothesis is valid we do not expect CEO pay to be strongly corre-
lated to firms’ performance. We test this hypothesis by examining how sensitive CEO pay
is to firm performance. According to the efficient pay hypothesis the marginal product of
managerial ability increases with firm size and it is optimal to assign the most talented
managers to the largest firms. Executives of larger firms receive higher compensation. In
addition, as the average firm becomes larger, managerial marginal products increase and
competition for scarce managerial talent will bid up compensation of CEOs. We test the
hypothesis by examining how responsive CEO pay is to firm size and whether CEO pay
increases as the average firm becomes larger in the market.
We estimate the following basic equation
ln(Cit) =
1∑
j=0
β′jXit−j +
1∑
j=0
γ′jXt−j + ηi + α1t+ α2t
2 + εit (1)
where Cit is compensation per board member in company i in year t. Compensation is
measured in real terms in thousands of 2006 Euros; Xit indicates firm characteristics such
as number of board members (No.Boardit); log of firm size (Sit), and firm net profits
(piit), both measured in millions of 2006 Euros. Xt is a vector of average market variables
capturing the characteristics of a typical firm in the market in year t14. These include:
14We experimented using different sets of lagged regressors, to account for the possibility that (a
combination of) past firm characteristics may affect CEO pay. Results, however, are not significantly
different from those reported below.
13
firm size (St), workers’ wages (W t), CEO pay (Ct), and annual average remuneration
of the top three CEOs in large US companies (C
US
t )
15. This specification implies that
the coefficient on profits pi (S) measures how strongly CEO pay responds to relative
performance (size) of the firm with respect to the rest of the market and the coefficient
on average profits (firm size), pi (S) tests for whether CEO pay responds to an increase
in typical firm profits (size) in the market. We include average workers’ wages (W t) to
test explicitly for a tight local labour market. We also include average CEO pay (Ct)
and annual average remuneration of the top three CEOs in large US companies (C
US
t )
to measure to what extent competition for local (Ct) and global managers (C
US
t ) can
explain CEO pay. t (t2) is a time trend to account for linear (quadratic) growth of CEO
pay and time trending market variables; ηi is an unobserved firm fixed effect. Table 5 in
the Appendix describes all variables in detail. Table 6 provides summary statistics.
In a first step (Table 1) we estimate specification (1) using only contemporaneous
regressors. In a second step (Table 2), we estimate specification (1) in full, using also
lagged regressors. Comparing estimates from the two sets of results should help us in
better understanding the “reaction time” of CEO compensation with respect to changes
in firm and market characteristics.
Table 1 has the following structure. Columns (1) to (3) show results for the entire pe-
riod 1977-2009. Columns (4) to (8) display results for the period 1977-2005, where the last
three years of our sample are dropped because information on US CEOs is available only
until 200516. Columns (9) to (10) display results for the shorter period 1990-2009 to help
us establish if any substantial change in the determinants of CEO compensation happened
after German re-unification. We control for size of the board in all specifications of Table
1, since our measure of CEO compensation is the average pay per board member. We
15Information for the US CEOs was kindly provided by Carola Frydman (MIT). Data is based on the
largest 50 firms according to Frydman and Saks (2010) and is available until 2005.
16Column (4) reports the same specification as of column (3), but until 2005 only. This is to provide
consistency in the sample used. In particular, a comparison between columns (3) and (4) indicates that
the drop in significance of firm profits is due to the exclusion of the last 3 years of the sample, rather
than to the inclusion of average firm characteristics and US compensation.
14
control for average profits in the market to estimate how CEO compensation is affected
by relative rather than absolute firm performance. The estimated correlation between
profits (measured for convenience of exposition in billions of Euros in the regression) and
CEO compensation is between 0.095 and 0.084 depending on the specification and it is
significant at the 5 percent level. 17 This implies that an increase in firm relative prof-
itability of 1 million Euros increases CEO compensation by 0.009 percent. The significant
and positive coefficient on average profits in column (2) suggests that German CEOs tend
to be (at least partly) compensated independently of their own firm’s performance, as
their pay increases by 0.06 percent when average profits in a sector increase by 1 million
Euros. It appears then that the incentives created by compensation packages in German
firms tend to be small and weakly aligned to the interests of shareholders.
In the literature on CEO pay there is a debate on the economic interpretation of
why the estimated coefficient on profits may turn out to be small. Jensen and Murphy
(1990) argue that CEOs in the US are paid like bureaucrats, since they are primarily
paid for increasing the size of their organization and receive small rewards for superior
performance. More recently, however, Hall and Liebman (1998) have questioned that
low pay for performance sensitivities are in fact measuring low incentives. They argue
that, since firm size has increased over time, the dollar change in CEO pay for a dollar
change in profits dramatically underestimates how much executives gain from improving
firm performance. Executives tend to own smaller percentage (and larger dollar) stakes
in larger firms with the result that firm growth leads to a lower pay for performance
sensitivities. 18
However, in our estimates the coefficient on profits becomes even smaller and stops
to be statistically significant once the years of the financial crisis are excluded from the
17In the regression, profits are measured in billion of euros to obtain meaningful coefficients. The
discussion that follows, though, reports results in terms of changes in million of Euros because the
changes in profits documented in our data set are in this order of magnitude.
18See Frydman and Jenter (2010) for a discussion and a comparison between the Jensen and Murphy
measure of a dollar change in CEO pay for a dollar change in profits and the Hall and Liebman measure
of a dollar change in CEO pay for a percentage change in profits.
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sample as in (columns (4) to (8)). This indicates that incentives appear not to have played
a significant role before 2006. These findings support the casual impression of Figure 7
that the sharp drop in profits in the great recession acted as an disciplining devise which
was linking CEO compensation back to firm performance in response to the the public
outrage over CEO compensation.
In column (2) we add firm size to examine whether larger firms pay their CEOs more.
The evidence indeed is supportive. A 1 percent increase in firm size increases CEO pay
by about 0.2 percent and the relationship is significant at the 1 percent level. Reported
results are consistent with previous evidence on CEO pay in the US and Germany. The
explanation for this being that CEO talent is valued more in larger firms where talent is
most productive. 19
Next, we turn to a test of the efficient pay hypothesis in column (3). Interestingly, we
find that CEO pay declines (rather than increases) as typical firm size St increases. This
finding is difficult to reconcile with the efficient pay hypothesis. One possible interpreta-
tion is that German firms increase the quest for manager talent when the economy shrinks
rather than when it expands as CEO effort is more in demand when firms go through
difficult times to find ways to mitigate losses and to recover faster. Note, however, that
in column (10) the coefficient of St turns positive and becomes significant (albeit only at
the 10% level) in the latest period of 1990-2005. One possible explanation for the change
in this relationship could be that after re-unification German firms became much more
exposed to international trade. The trade to GDP ratio almost doubled between 1990
and 2005 suggesting that increased international trade may have played a role. 20
In columns (5) to (8) we test more explicitly whether CEOs are paid more in face
of a tighter labour market in general (an increase in W t), a tighter market for local
manager talent (an increase in Ct ) or a tighter market for global manager talent (an
19Among others, see Murphy (1999), Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) and Gabaix and Landier (2008).
20For the role of international trade for the rise in CEO pay see Marin and Verdier (forthcoming) and
Marin (2009).
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increase in C
US
t ).
21. We find evidence that more competition for white collar workers and
local managers (with somewhat weaker evidence for the more recent period 1990-2005 in
columns (9) and (10)) has contributed to an increase in CEO pay, while global competition
for managers does not appear to have contributed to an increase in pay in Germany. 22
In Table 2 we re-estimate some specifications of Table 1 by allowing for lagged ad-
justments to better understand the dynamics of the responsiveness of compensation to
changes in firm and market characterisitcs. Interestingly, we find that German CEO com-
pensation responds now to a tighter global labour market for manager talent when we
allow for a delay of one year but this effect is negligible. A 1 percent increase in US CEO
pay increases CEO pay in Germany by 0.03 to 0.05 percent. CEO pay in Germany still
adjusts, however, immediately and strongly to a tighter local labour market for manager
talent. A 1 percent increase in average CEO pay in the local market increases CEO pay
between 0.23 and 0.32 percent. Otherwise, we confirm the previous estimates of Table 1
with somewhat stronger effects of Si,t and St on CEO compensation when one year lags
are included.23
To summarise, the presented evidence does seem to suggest that local competition
for workers in general and for managers in particular has acted as a driving force behind
the rise in CEO pay in Germany. We find also that the manager power hypothesis
is supported by our analysis except for the great recession of 2009. The efficient pay
hypothesis, however, is rejected by data, because the identified quest for manager talent
does not appear to be coming from a shift in the size distribution of firms.
21We have data for average US CEO compensation only until 2005. Therefore, for transparency and
clarity of results, in column (4) we have reported results from specification (3) but until 2005. It can be
noted that the only significant change takes place for the coefficient for firm profits, which decreases in
size and is not significant anymore.
22In this context, see Marin and Verdier (forthcoming), Marin (2009), and Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2009)
for the importance of international trade rather than a global labour market for managers for the rise in
executive pay.
23We have tested further lags, but results do not substantially differ from those presented here.
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Table 2: Fixed Effects with Lagged Regressors
1977-2009 1977-2005 1990-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No.Boardit -0.068
∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
No.Boardit−1 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
pit/1000 0.078
∗ 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.053 0.053
(0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
pit−1/1000 0.031+ 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
pit/1000 0.463
∗∗ 0.362∗ 0.228 0.409∗ 0.271 0.250
(0.084) (0.158) (0.168) (0.193) (0.283) (0.283)
pit−1/1000 0.286∗∗ 0.442∗ -0.235 -0.116 0.004 0.076
(0.084) (0.190) (0.216) (0.215) (0.236) (0.245)
lnSt 0.160
∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.176∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
lnSt−1 0.064∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
lnSt -0.006 -0.004 -0.102
∗∗ -0.082∗∗ 0.039
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.060)
lnSt−1 -0.107∗∗ -0.123∗∗ -0.123∗∗ -0.103∗∗ 0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.055)
lnW t 0.827
∗ -0.576
(0.409) (0.588)
lnW t−1 -0.333 0.181
(0.351) (0.506)
lnCt 0.385
∗∗ 0.315∗∗ 0.138
(0.076) (0.088) (0.114)
lnCt−1 0.108 0.026 -0.005
(0.077) (0.085) (0.123)
lnC
US
t -0.013 -0.036
+ 0.006 0.028
(0.019) (0.022) (0.040) (0.039)
lnC
US
t−1 0.070
∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.017 0.021
(0.022) (0.023) (0.046) (0.036)
Observations 18560 16164 16164 16164 10292 10292
Adjusted R2 0.292 0.262 0.267 0.267 0.220 0.220
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
Quadratic time trend and firm fixed effects included in all specifications. Specifications from column (2)
are until 2005. For consistency, column (2) repeats the specification in column (1), but using data until
2005 only. 19
5 Endogeneity
In the previous section we did not allow for the possibility that our regressors Xit such as
firm size, profits and other firm characteristics may be endogenous. However, the causality
between CEO pay, firm size and profits is not entirely clear. Do firms pay their CEOs
more in larger more profitable firms or do firms grow in size and in profitability when
hiring more expensive (and presumable more able) CEOs? Moreover, CEO pay displays
strong persistence over time (see Figure 1) which may reflect the composition of pay into
a fixed part (strongly autocorrelated over time) and a variable part (which may or may
not depend on firm’s performance). As a consequence, lagged CEO compensation may
well be an omitted variable in the static specification used in the previous section. We
address these issues in this section. 24
To assess the importance of biases associated with fixed effects and endogeneity we
proceed with the following estimation techniques. In a first step, we include lagged com-
pensation as a regressor to account for omitted variable bias (dynamic fixed effect estima-
tion). In a second step, we use a “system” GMM estimation to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in the model. 25
We introduce a dynamic panel data model of the determinants of CEO pay by extend-
ing specification (1) to include the lagged dependent variable:
ln(Cit) = pi ln(Cit−1) +
1∑
j=0
β′jXit−j +
1∑
j=0
γ′jXt−j + ηi + α1t+ α2t
2 + εit
Consistent estimation of equation (5) depends on whether we assume our set of co-
variates to be exogenous.
In a second stage, we consider the (realistic) possibility that the covariates Xit are
24Examples in the literature where persistency is explicitly accounted for include Conyon (1998) and
Main et al. (1996). We also consider that there is at least one channel by which past and present CEO
pay may affect firm characteristics (namely size and performance). As noted by Baranchuk et al. (2011),
executives’ talent itself can affect firm performance and size.
25See Arrelano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998).
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correlated with the error term other than via fixed effects. In this case the within trans-
formation estimator does not deliver consistent results for the coefficients on the Xit
regressors. In particular, in the presence of dynamics and of endogenous regressors, both
OLS and fixed effects estimates are inconsistent and instrumental variables are required.
In the absence of ad-hoc external instruments, we can use a “system” GMM estimator
(Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998)) for equation (5). Since we have
an unbalanced panel, we use orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover (1995)) instead
of first differences to overcome the possibility of losing too many observations. We also
limit the number of lags used as instruments to one and two and “collapse” the matrix of
instruments to avoid proliferation of (weak) instrument. 26
Table 3 shows results for the dynamic specification using both fixed effects (left panel)
and “system” GMM (right panel) estimators without (columns (1), (2), (5) and (6)) and
with lagged adjustment (columns (3), (4), (7) and (8)) for our preferred specifications
from Tables 1. Because market variables are highly collinear, including lagged values
makes standard errors of GMM coefficients too large, reducing the robustness of these
estimates. For this reason, we only include contemporaneous values of firm and market
characteristics in this set of specifications.
As expected, contemporaneous CEO compensation is positively and significantly cor-
related with lagged compensation confirming that executive compensation is strongly
autocorrelated over time. Compared to the static specifications we find in the dynamic
specifications that the role of a tighter local and global market for talent for the rise in
CEO pay is somewhat smaller, in particular in the “system” GMM specification with lags
(see column 8)27. All other estimates remain robust to the alternative estimation tech-
niques. In particular, the manager power hypothesis is not and the efficient pay hypothesis
is once more rejected by the data. All specifications in Table 3 indicate that CEOs in
26We use the STATA command xtabond2 developed by Roodman (2006) for these estimates.
27We do not control here for average wages of white collar workers. This variable does not have a
significant effect in the dynamic specification in table 2 and is strongly collinear with average firm size,
making the system GMM estimates too unstable.
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Table 3: Dynamic FE and GMM - 1977-2009
Fixed Effects “System” GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnCit−1 0.508∗∗ 0.505∗∗ 0.808∗∗ 0.827∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.055) (0.059)
No.Boardit -0.048
∗∗ -0.048∗∗ 0.018 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.011)
piit/1000 0.051 0.051 0.071 0.027
(0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.050)
pit/1000 0.560
∗∗ 0.249+ 0.495∗∗ 0.299+
(0.119) (0.134) (0.076) (0.166)
lnSit 0.120
∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.025)
lnSt -0.055
∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.092∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
lnCt 0.172
∗∗ 0.054
(0.055) (0.071)
lnC
US
t 0.038
∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Observations 18560 16164 18560 16164
Adjusted R2 0.451 0.452
sarganp 0.000 0.016
hansenp 0.132 0.456
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
AR(3) test (p-value) 0.872 0.784
Degrees of freedom 15.000 17.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05,
** p<0.01. Quadratic time trend and firm fixed effects included in all specifica-
tions. Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation GMM-type: No.Boardt−3,
No.Boardt−4, lnSt−2, pi/1000t−1, pi/1000t−2 all collapsed; instruments for levels equa-
tion GMM-type: ∆lnCt−3, ∆lnCt−4, ∆pi/1000t, ∆lnSt−1 all collapsed. Specifications
including lnC
US
t are for the period 1977-2005.
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Germany are rewarded when the market is doing well (and average profits of the industry
are large) rather than when profits of their own firms are large. CEOs in Germany do
not appear to be compensated for outperforming the market. Moreover, the relationship
between firm size and compensation becomes substantially smaller confirming the hypoth-
esis that at least a part of this relationship is spurious. Finally, all specifications suggest
that CEOs in Germany are rewarded for managing the firm in difficult times when the
average firm size drops rather than when it increases as is suggested by the efficient pay
hypothesis. 28
All the diagnostics for our GMM estimates are satisfactory. Following the xtabond2
procedure, we are able to use a limited number of instruments and overidentifying re-
strictions (a maximum of 17 in the most extensive specification). All Hansen tests for
the validity of overidentifying restrictions support the adequacy of the models. Because
the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests (Arellano and Bond (1991)) reject the absence of
second-order serial correlation, we use lags 3 and 4 to instrument the lagged dependent
variable (equation in levels).
28One reason why average CEO pay as a measure for the tightness of the local labour market for
executives becomes insignificant in the “system” GMM is because it is highly correlated with average
CEO compensation in the US (the correlation coefficient being 0.93). While this does not appear to affect
the fixed effects results, it clearly affects the estimates of the standard errors in the “system” GMM.
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5.1 Is Bank Compensation Different?
During the recent financial crisis banks and financial institutions have been in the spot-
light. CEOs in banks have been accused of greed taking on excessive risks in pursuit
of profits. Moreover, the payout of large bonuses to executives in financial institutions
such as HypoRealEstate, Commerzbank, and WestLB saved from bankruptcy by taxpay-
ers’ money are seen as a stark illustration that CEO pay is not connected to economic
performance. In the US the explosion of CEO pay has taken place particularly in the
financial sector and has provoked strong public reactions such as the Occupy Wall Street
movement in the US.29 Can we find a similar development in Germany? In this section
weexamine whether bank CEOs are indeed a special case and whether their compensation
differs from the rest of the economy. We can answer this question, since about 19 per
cent of the firms in our sample are banks.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of CEO pay for the total board as well as per board
member in German banks and selected percentiles of bank CEO compensation. Until
1992 CEO compensation in the banking sector looks similar to compensation in the entire
economy. However, the increase in CEO pay in banks in 1992-2000 has been more dramatic
reaching almost e 700.000 already in 2000 (with an annual increase of 11 percent). When
the dot com bubble burst, the fall was also much steeper with pay falling below e500.000
in 2003. After 2004 compensation in banks recovered again but never again reached the
peak level of the year 2000. Over the entire period 1977-2007 CEO pay in banks doubled
from e220.000 to e450.000 which is a mild increase compared to a more than 3 fold
increase in the total economy. As for the rest of the economy, the increase in CEO pay
in banks is largely due to an increase of the top 5 percent of the best paid CEOs who
reached pay levels of over e2 mio in the year 2000 (panel (b)).
Why has CEO pay in the banking sector increased less than in the economy? Why
29In the US, the financial sector paid much larger wages compared to the rest of the economy. The wage
premium of the financial sector has been attributed to financial deregulation and its resulting attraction
for human capital, see Philippon and Reshef (2009).
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has bank pay been so much more volatile after 1992? We turn to Figure 6 for an answer.
It shows that the median and mean of the two possible drivers of CEO pay in banks -
firm size and profits - have increased much less and have been much more volatile after
1992 than in the rest of the economy. Deflated net median profits and bank size hardly
increased during the three decades of 1977-2007. Net profits increased from e8 mio in
1992 to almost e 40 mio in 1999 before collapsing to around e5 mio in 2001. After 2001
profits fluctuated around e10 mio and e15 mio before dropping again to about e2 mio at
the onset of the financial crisis. Firm size shows a similar pattern of volatility after 1992.
Apparently, CEOs in banks in Germany benefited in particular from the dot com years as
profits and bank balance sheets exploded but they gained less from the years before the
financial crisis of 2008-2009. The CEO pay discount in banking is not as surprising as it
may seem at first sight, since unlike the US Germany did not experience the same type of
financial deregulation in the 1990s and banking and financial institutions in Germany are
probably not the most attractive place for bright and talented managers as Wall Street is
in the US. Moreover, Germany’s great recession of 2009 has been triggered by a collapse
of trade and financial flows rather than by a failure of the domestic financial sector per
se. The financial sector in Germany suffered when the US financial crisis was globalized
and reached Germany.
Figure 7 finally sheds further light on the CEO discount in the banking sector in
Germany. With pay levels of over e 700.000 in 2006, manufacturing and services are the
highest paying sectors in Germany followed by banks (e 550.000) and insurance companies
(e 520.000). It appears that the CEO premium in manufacturing and services is mainly
driven by profits rather than by firm size, while the dramatic increase in banks’ balance
sheets appears not to be reflected in CEO compensation in banks.
In Table 4 we report estimates for the subsample of banks. Columns (1) and (2) show
the results for the static model without and with lags included, while column (3) gives
25
Figure 5: Board Compensation, 1977-2008
Banks
(a) Mean across firms (b) Selected Percentiles
Note: Vertical bars indicate official recession years in Germany. Pay levels (in 2006-constant Euros) based
on data for 500 largest public and limited liabilities companies. Total remuneration defined as the sum of
salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options, stock grants, and other compensation. Percentiles are evaluated
for per capita real wages of board only.
Figure 6: Profits and Firm Size - 1977-2008
Banks
(a) Mean across Firms (b) Median across Firms
Note: Vertical bars indicate official recession years in Germany. Profits and size (in 2006-constant Euros)
based on data for 500 largest public and limited liabilities companies. Profits are after tax. Size defined as
balance sheet totals (banks), insurance premia (insurance companies), and sales (manufacturing and other
services).
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Figure 7: Compensation, Firm Size and Profits by Sector: A Snapshot
(a) (b)
(c)
Note: Manufacture indicates manufacture and service sectors. Data is based on 500 largest public and limited
liabilities companies. CEO remuneration (defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options, stock
grants, and other compensation) is calculated as the total compensation of the executive board divided by the size
of the board. Ratio to average compensation is defined as CEO compensation divided by earnings of full-time
white-collar employees.
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Table 4: CEO Pay and Firm Characteristics: Fixed Effects without and with Lags -
Banks
1977-2005 1990-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnCit−1 0.366∗∗ 0.340∗∗
(0.048) (0.052)
No.Boardit -0.051
∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.052∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.050∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.016)
No.Boardit−1 -0.005 0.013 -0.006 0.011
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011)
piit/1000 0.144
∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.125∗∗
(0.051) (0.028) (0.022) (0.043) (0.025) (0.021)
piit−1/1000 0.064 0.025 0.052 0.021
(0.072) (0.055) (0.070) (0.055)
pit/1000 0.149 -0.204 0.239 0.605 -1.706
∗ -0.854
(0.352) (0.485) (0.457) (0.459) (0.833) (0.874)
pit−1/1000 0.422 0.097 1.460∗ 0.874
(0.485) (0.529) (0.651) (0.708)
lnSit 0.094
∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.065∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.056+
(0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.038) (0.036) (0.031)
lnSit−1 0.026∗ -0.003 0.026 -0.009
(0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
lnSt -0.108
∗∗ -0.194∗∗ -0.165∗∗ 0.082 -0.495+ -0.431
(0.032) (0.046) (0.047) (0.171) (0.278) (0.320)
lnSt−1 -0.107∗∗ -0.075∗ -1.214∗ -0.941+
(0.038) (0.037) (0.496) (0.503)
lnW t -0.327 -0.109 -0.059 -0.023 4.910
+ 3.693
(0.438) (0.950) (0.968) (1.061) (2.615) (2.371)
lnW t−1 -1.125+ -1.104 -3.077 -2.627
(0.658) (0.699) (1.872) (1.977)
lnCt 0.470
∗∗ 0.356∗ 0.280 0.389 0.986∗ 0.816∗
(0.137) (0.175) (0.180) (0.264) (0.409) (0.403)
lnCt−1 0.147 0.105 1.299∗ 1.051∗
(0.199) (0.191) (0.570) (0.532)
lnC
US
t 0.025 -0.024 -0.027 -0.118 0.286
∗ 0.200+
(0.031) (0.049) (0.047) (0.073) (0.114) (0.119)
lnC
US
t−1 0.157
∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.205+ 0.168
(0.044) (0.044) (0.105) (0.107)
Observations 3648 2772 2772 2220 1744 1744
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.352 0.435 0.242 0.293 0.371
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **
p<0.01. Quadratic time trend and firm fixed effects included in all specifications.
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the results of the dynamic fixed effect estimation. Columns (4) to (6) shows the same
results for the period after German unification. We find several dimensions in which banks
differ from other firms in the economy. First, banks provide incentives for their CEOs
more than other firms. The estimated coefficient for profits of 0.14 is significant at the 1
percent level and it suggests that an increase in banks’ relative profitability of 1 million
Euros increases compensation for bank managers by 0.014 percent. Moreover, CEOs in
banks are rewarded for performance rather than when the financial industry at large is
doing well. Second, we find much stronger evidence that local and global competition for
managers has been bidding up compensation for bank managers in Germany. A 1 percent
increase in average CEO pay increases CEO pay by between 0.36 and 0.47 percent, and a
1 percent increase in average CEO wages in the US increases German CEO pay by 0.15
percent. The latter effect is almost 5 times larger in banks compared to the rest of the
economy. Third, the effect of local and global competition for managers on CEO pay
becomes much stronger after German unification in the period 1990-2005. The estimated
coefficients double in size from 0.36 to .99 for local competition and from 0.15 to 0.50 for
global competition.
6 Conclusion
This paper documents the evolution of CEO pay in Germany in the last three decades
based on unique data of 500 largest German firms. CEO pay increased 3.2 fold in real
terms over the period 1977-2009. We show that two potential drivers of CEO pay - the
trend in profits and in firms size - can only partly account for the trend in CEO pay in
Germany as firm size increased 6.5 fold and profits remained somewhat flat during the
same period. In contrast to the US, we find a CEO discount in the German banking sector
which appears to be driven by lower bank profits and perhaps by the fact that Germany
did not experience the same type of financial deregulation as the US. We also find support
for a stronger link between CEO pay and firm performance in the last financial crisis of
29
2009 compared to previous recessions.
We then turn to a more rigorous analysis by testing two of the most prominent hy-
potheses of executive pay in the literature: the manager power hypothesis and the efficient
pay hypothesis. Our findings can be summarized in the following points. First, we find
support for the manager power hypothesis for Germany as executive compensation does
not involve incentives for performance. German CEOs tend to be rewarded when the
sector is doing well rather than the firm they work for. We reject however the manager
power hypothesis for the financial sector and for the great recession in 2009 (especially
when compared to previous recessions). Second, we reject the efficient pay hypothesis
for the economy as a whole as well as for the financial sector as increases in the typical
firm size do not contribute to increases in CEO pay. On the contrary, we find that CEO
pay and the demand for manager talent increases in difficult times when the typical firm
size shrinks, perhaps in an attempt of the firm to optimally limit losses. Third, we find
strong and economically important evidence that domestic and global competition for
managers has contributed to the rise in executive pay in Germany. Surprisingly, however,
the impact of competition for managers on executive compensation has become weaker
in the last two decades. Fourth, the effect of local and global competition for managers
is particularly pronounced in the banking sector in particular in the last two decades.
Our results answer some questions but pose new ones. For example, we find a strong
impact of domestic competition for managers on executive pay, but we cannot say where
this effect of competition for managers is coming from, since we do not find evidence
that a shift in the size distribution of firms has intensified the quest for manager talent.
Further research is needed to answer this question.
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Appendix: Data
Table 5: Variable Description
Variable Name Description Notes
Cit Per capita remuneration of the execu-
tive board at time t, in thousands of
2006 Euros
It includes monetary and non-
monetary compensations, therefore
values of (fringe) taxable bene-
fits, long- and mid-term incentives
(stock options, performance shares,
restricted stocks etc.), short-term
incentives (profit participation on
annual profits, mainly results-oriented
royalties) and fixed salary.
Boardit Average number of members in execu-
tive board in year t
Sit Size of firm at time t, in millions of
2006 Euros
Measured as balance sheet totals for
banks, insurance premia for insurance
companies and sales for manufactur-
ing and services. Balance sheet totals
and sales refer to the Allgemeinege-
sellschaft or, in the case of a control-
ling company, to the consolidated fig-
ures.
St Size of average firm in the market at
time t, in millions of 2006 Euros
piit Firm profits (after tax) at time t, in
millions of 2006 Euros
pit Net profits of average firm in the mar-
ket at time t, in millions of 2006 Euros
W t Average yearly wage of male employees
in the German economy at time t, in
thousands of 2006 Euros
Data from German quarterly earnings
survey.
Ct Average yearly per capita board com-
pensation at time t, in thousands of
2006 Euros
C
US
t Average yearly remuneration of top
three CEOs in large US companies
Available until 2005
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
All Firms - 1977-2009
Count Mean Median SD Min Max
No.Board 22546 3.982 3.500 2.159 0.330 67.000
C 22546 378.932 278.665 445.563 0.025 17870.758
S 22546 7580.108 687.689 42836.260 0.084 2099145.000
pi 22546 57.872 7.679 387.774 -25747.432 11291.259
W 22546 34794.763 35138.281 3350.669 28519.418 39072.000
All Firms - 1997-2009
Count Mean Median SD Min Max
No.Board 8825 4.067 3.750 2.061 0.830 67.000
C 8825 531.975 366.090 635.014 1.420 17870.758
S 8825 12882.207 1093.538 64248.991 0.084 2099145.000
pi 8825 104.889 14.777 595.218 -25747.432 11291.259
W 8825 38091.103 38842.402 1051.712 36035.223 39072.000
Banks - 1977-2009
Count Mean Median SD Min Max
No.Board 4210 3.798 3.000 2.090 1.000 14.420
C 4210 390.350 282.384 475.287 9.354 8687.227
S 4210 30529.121 3335.662 94539.537 2.915 2099145.000
pi 4210 47.262 8.779 352.486 -6031.684 6366.125
Banks - 1997-2009
Count Mean Median SD Min Max
No.Board 1853 3.797 3.000 1.755 1.000 13.000
C 1853 527.811 348.417 664.747 43.365 8687.227
S 1853 48388.481 4103.043 132870.930 9.562 2099145.000
pi 1853 63.913 10.288 518.727 -6031.684 6366.125
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